

SECRET/NOFORN

Executive Registry

80-1326

13 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of State,
12 May 1980 (U)

1. Ron Spiers (D/INR) sat in on the meeting. I went through the discussion outline point by point. (U)

2. On the PDB, he did not indicate a preference for either a substantive person to deliver it or writing notes. I told him we would do either or both. I pointed out that he might get a little more wholesome answer if it were staffed and returned to him the next morning. We'll just have to wait and see what he says as time goes on. (C/NF)

3. I showed him a number of our products. He showed genuine interest in them. I told him we would tailor anything to his needs. (U)

4. He asked if for his forthcoming meeting with Gromyko we could provide him any information on what might be on Gromyko's mind. I told him that we could have our Soviet experts try to deduce what Gromyko might raise, but that [REDACTED] Let's do a hasty look at whether we can get something together for him that we could send by message that would forecast Gromyko's outlook at this time. (S/NF)

5. We talked about the Presidential briefs and his coming. I didn't get any specifics on areas that he wanted covered, but when I told him we might do a Southwest Asia-Middle East regional survey he thought that would be helpful. (S/NF)

25X1A

25X6

Orig C1 By 169947
Rvw 13 May 2000
Reason D9c.1

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25X1C

[REDACTED]

25X6

10. [REDACTED]

Ron

11. The Secretary was very tired and very behind schedule. (C/NF)

[REDACTED]

25X1A

STANFIELD TURNER
Director

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

PB/NSC

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA		1-6		
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O		X		
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	PB/NSC		X		
19	NIO/USSR	4			
20	ES		X		
21					
22					

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

Paragraphs extracted for action or information as indicated above.

General Items

25X1A
25X1C

- Regret unable attend Monday's PRC on [REDACTED]
- Possible follow-ups from last meeting [REDACTED]

- PDB: is he finding it useful? are we able to answer questions he may have when delivered? (see [REDACTED] memo opposite 25X1A
--due to Muskie's late arrival at the office you might want to ask if he would like this delivered at home; I understand he gets up early to read)
- Any particular pubs he would like to have? or subjects he would like to get info on? (I understand he has asked his bureaucracy for info on country dependencies on ME oil)
- How was cable re Gromyko he had asked for & you sent?
- Any feedback on your trip itinerary (Spiers took to get Moose to look at)--more on this at Tab D

- Pres. Briefs: sorry he could not attend last briefing (you have at Tab B)

- Discuss your next Pres. Brief on Pre-Summit

• Discuss Iran

- Need for policy options

25X1C

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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2 June 1980

*DCI raised with
Secretary at 6/4
meeting*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Secretary Muskie and the PDB

1. We are now into our third week of having one of our own staffers deliver the PDB to Secretary Muskie. We thought it would be useful, when you see the Secretary, to get his reaction and any suggestions. He seems generally satisfied with the book and is appreciative of having a substantive person present during his reading. We have been able to respond to a number of specific questions or requests--either immediately or by the next morning.

2. We also would like to raise with you one fairly major problem we have been having. We simply have been unable to establish with the Secretary (or more accurately, with his secretary) a regular, set time to deliver the PDB each morning. Unlike Vance or Brown, he does not devote time to an initial "reading in" period. He comes in just in time for his 8:30 staff meeting. His secretary tries to schedule us, on an ad hoc basis, as soon as possible after the staff meeting. But, as often as not, unforeseen developments or sudden changes in the Secretary's calendar keep bumping us. We have never been able to make delivery before 9:30 and on a number of occasions we have made several trips downtown only to discover upon arrival that we have been bumped once again.

3. This, of course, would be a problem whether or not we use a courier or one of our own staffers. Needless to say, we will continue to get the book to him whenever he wants it. But if he does value it as a useful morning briefing, he might want to consider a more regular procedure. If the opportunity arises you might try to suggest that:

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SUBJECT: Secretary Muskie and the PDB

--the PDB would be most useful if read before the Secretary begins his schedule of substantive discussions and meetings.

--and that much of its contents are highly perishable and that its value diminishes as the day proceeds.

25X1A



Chief, Current
Intelligence Group

Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

Follow up on discussion with [REDACTED] last week in my office.

I would recommend that if you decide to raise the issue, you raise it with SECSTA in an effort to be helpful, and that you let him take the lead. While the IC/CIA would unquestionably be a major participant in such an effort, I would steer clear of any action which might look like you are second-guessing SECSTA or the President on foreign policy.

Let's ask for a Muskie 1st week 1
2 June - Bro fed from version
2 This. Mid East Pres said

Date

5/21/80

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

15 MAY 1980

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Reassessment of U.S. Foreign Policy

*DCI raised
with SecState
at 6/4/80 meeting*

1. To me it appears appropriate for you to determine the interest and intentions of the Administration in conducting a review of U.S. foreign policy. I fear that without some forethought, there might well be a major flail to conduct such a review between November and January. It cannot be well done in such a short period of time. The case for determining the Administration's intentions are outlined below:

a. A thorough and comprehensive review of foreign policy will take a minimum of six months and will deeply involve the Intelligence Community. If the results of this assessment are to be available to the President at the outset of his new Administration, the process should be set in motion almost immediately.

b. The first step in this process, following the President's decision to undertake a review, is the establishment of a small, high-level NSC working group to formulate the questions and to direct the review process. You should have representation on the working group.

c. You might wish to discuss this matter with Bruce Clarke and Dick Lehman. Dick played a major role in the Carter transition, and I understand that the National Intelligence Council is presently giving some thought to the problem of addressing a major foreign policy assessment later this year.

2. It is recommended that you take the initiative in raising the question of the review.

a. One suggested approach would be to propose the idea to Mr. Muskie and let him raise the matter with the President. It is appropriate that the Secretary of State take the lead in a foreign policy review process.

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15 May 1986

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SUBJECT: Reassessment of U.S. Foreign Policy

b. An alternate approach would be to raise the issue directly with the President or Dr. Brzezinski. In deference to Mr. Muskie's position as Secretary of State, I recommend you speak with him initially should you take this approach.

c. Attached is a list of issues appropriate to the foreign policy review which illustrate the dimensions of such a review and the importance of undertaking this review early on.

Attachment
As stated



25X1A

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POLICY REVIEW ISSUES

The following topics are illustrative of the first-order issues which the proposed NSC review would include. In some instances, they amount to a reexamination of PRM efforts undertaken early in the Carter Administration, which must be revisited in light of Afghanistan, Iran, SALT deferral, continuing Soviet arms buildup, etc. Others are more clearly examples of new issues that will have to be addressed in the coming year. This list should not be considered an exhaustive or indepth agenda for such a policy review. However, it does depict the nature of the policy review exercise that will be required.

UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNS

0 U.S. Relations with the USSR

Military Balance--Strategic/Conventional

SALT Negotiations
Detente
Soviet Initiatives in

Afghanistan
Iran
Southeast Asia
Africa

Relations with Soviet allies

Eastern Europe
Cuba
Vietnam

0 Middle East

Peace
Relations with

Israel
Egypt
The oil states
The radical Arabs

Libya
Iraq
PLO

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- 0 U.S. Relations with China
- 0 Arms Control and Assistance
- 0 Nuclear Proliferation
- 0 U.S. Position and Initiatives on Human Rights
- 0 Relations with the Underdeveloped World

Trade and Technology Transfers

- 0 Relations with the Industrialized States

Japan
Western Europe

ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS OF UNITED STATES POWER

- 0 U.S. Military Capability
 - Strategic
 - Conventional
- 0 Health of U.S. Economy--Strengths/Weaknesses
- 0 U.S. Political Character and Strength--national/international
- 0 U.S. Vulnerabilities

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